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In December 1987, GM closed five
auto assembly plants in the United
States, including one in Norwood, Ohio.
What made the Norwood closure nota-
ble from an economic perspective was
not the plant's size — which at roughly
140,000 cars per year was moderate by
automotive standards — but its location.
Approximately 100 miles to the south,
Toyota was about to open an auto pro-
duction facility in Georgetown, Ken-
tucky. And at the same time, 100 miles
to the northeast, Honda announced plans
to expand its U.S. operations with a
plant in East Liberty, Ohio.
Against the backdrop of flat motor
vehicle sales, the U.S. expansion of
Japanese-owned production facilities
("transplants") has intensified the al-
ready fierce competition among manu-
facturers. The increasing number of
domestic auto plant closings, coupled
with only moderately reduced car im-
ports, suggests that the native domestic
producers have yielded the most so far.
And unless the U.S. demand for motor
vehicles grows substantially (a doubtful
prospect), additional plant closings are a
virtual certainty in the coming years.
The economic health of the motor
vehicle industry is of particular impor-
tance to the Fourth District economy.
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Motor vehicle and vehicle-related pro-
duction accounts for at least 20 percent
of Ohio's manufacturing output and
roughly 15 percent of the state's manu-
facturing jobs. Moreover, the District is
in the heart of the so-called "transplant
corridor," where a preponderance of
the Japanese facilities are located. The
District is also home to many native
U.S. auto plants, which may be subject
to sharp cutbacks and closings over the
next few years.
This Economic Commentary reviews
the developments that have led to
chronic excess capacity in U.S. motor
vehicle manufacturing and considers
the prospects facing this industry in the
decade ahead.
"Is there going to be enough business
to go around? The short-term answer
is no."
E. Michael Mutchler,
Vice President, GM, 1988
During the past 12 years, and particu-
larly since 1986, the growth rate of U.S.
auto (and light truck) capacity has out-
paced the nation's demand for these ve-
hicles (table 1). At the production peak
in the late 1970s, total new car/light
truck capacity was roughly 14.5 million
units per year, against actual production
of 12.6 million—an idle capacity of
about 13 percent. By the 1986 model
year, idle capacity in the industry had
risen to about 19 percent. Although
seven major auto and light truck plants
were closed between 1980 and 1985,
predominantly by Chrysler and Ford, 10
plants were also opened over this period
(six by GM and three by the Japanese).
And despite nine more plant closings
between 1987 and 1989, idle capacity in
auto/light truck manufacturing reached
28 percent in the 1990 model year.
The expansion of Japanese motor
vehicle manufacturing in the United
States, combined with flat sales, has
doubled the amount of idle capacity
in this industry since the late 1970s.
As a result, continued belt-tightening
and plant closings can be expected
over the next several years.
One important reason for the imbalance
between our ability to produce autos
and light trucks and our demand for
these vehicles has been the prolifera-
tion of Japanese transplants. In 1982,
Honda opened the first such facility in
this country, in Marysville, Ohio. Ini-
tially capable of manufacturing only
about 150,000 cars per year (less than
2.5 percent of the U.S. total), the plant
flourished and today can turn out more
than 500,000 cars annually.
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Over the next eight years, seven more
Japanese-owned assembly plants were
established in the United States. By
early 1990, the transplants were capa-
ble of producing about 1.6 million ve-
hicles annually, approximately 12 per-
cent of the U.S. new car/light truck
potential. The production capacity at
these plants is expected to expand even
further over the next few years. In-
deed, potential Japanese transplant pro-
duction is likely to exceed total Japa-
nese imports to this country by 1994.
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As the Japanese auto companies were
increasing their U.S. production capabil-
ities, the growth of the domestic motor
vehicle market leveled off. In the 1950s
and 1960s, total U.S. auto and truck
sales (including imports) grew at an
average annual rate of nearly 4.6 per-
cent. But since reaching 14.6 million
units in 1973, motor vehicle sales here
have risen an average of only 0.5 per-
cent per year.
Several developments have softened do-
mestic motor vehicle demand over the
past decade, and because many of these
are demographic in origin, they are like-
ly to continue to depress sales during
the 1990s. For example, after rising
nearly 2 percent per year from the late
1960s through the 1970s, the average
yearly growth rate of the driving-age
population slowed dramatically in the
1980s and is projected to increase only
about 0.8 percent per year this decade.
The rate of increase in the number of U.S.
households also decelerated over the last
10 years, a trend that is expected to con-
tinue during the 1990s. The growth in
motor vehicle purchases has been further
dampened by a more moderate inflow of
women into the labor force over the last
decade.
In addition, there has been a substantial
drop-off in the replacement demand for
vehicles. Simply put, cars and trucks are
now more durable. For example, despite
an increase in the annual number of
miles traveled per automobile, the aver-
age age of autos on our nation's high-
ways rose from 6.4 years in 1979 to 7.6
years in 1985, where it has since stabi-
lized. The aging of the U.S. auto stock
may have resulted in part from a com-
bination of factors responsible for the
decline in household savings over the
same period.
4 But it is also likely that
quality improvements have significantly
prolonged cars' life expectancy.
The flat U.S. vehicle market has not
measurably affected the transplants,
which have been operating at nearly


























a. Includes a Volkswagen plant in Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, that closed after the 1988 model year.
NOTE: Total domestic capacity estimates are taken from unpublished Federal Reserve Board data. The
methodology used to calculate these estimates is described in Richard D. Raddock, "Recent Developments in
Industrial Capacity and Utilization," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 76, no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 411-35.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and
Ward's Automotive Reports.
full capacity since the facilities were
opened. And while transplant car and
light truck sales have been increasing
since 1983, this phenomenon appears
to have caused only a small decline in
the U.S. market share commanded by
Japanese imports. Rather, it is the na-
tive manufacturers who have lost the
greatest share of the domestic vehicle
market (figure 1).
We estimate that each percentage point
rise in the market share of transplant ve-
hicles has been accompanied by a two-
thirds percentage point drop in the mar-
ket share of native producers and a
one-third percentage point reduction in
the market share of imports. GM appears
to have been the principal casualty. In
1980, when five companies were pro-
ducing cars and light trucks in the
United States, GM accounted for almost
44 percent of total sales. By 1990, with
10 companies manufacturing vehicles
here, GM's market share had fallen to 36
percent.
"And I say that Your Highnesses ought
not to consent that any [other] foreign-
er does business or sets foot here ..."
Christopher Columbus,
Journal of the First Voyage,
November 27, 1492
A number of factors account for the rising
popularity of Japanese cars and trucks,
including the surge in gasoline prices in
the 1970s and the resulting preference
for smaller, more fuel-efficient models.
Japan's motor vehicle industry also pos-
sessed price advantages stemming from
lower labor costs, higher productivity,
and a strong dollar relative to the yen.
Nonetheless, several political and eco-
nomic turns encouraged the Japanese
to move some of their production facil-
ities to this country. For one, the grow-
ing popularity of Japanese imports
created a political backlash here in the
early 1980s, when domestic motor ve-
hicle sales began to founder. A number
of parties in the industry sought protec-
tive legislation, and in 1981, the two
countries agreed upon "voluntary" re-
strictions, or quotas, on the number of
cars Japan could export to the United
States each year. Because these quotas
were based largely on each company's
then-current U.S. auto sales, they were
particularly limiting on the smaller,
more growth-oriented Japanese auto-
makers, such as Honda and Mazda.
Since 1985, moreover, there has been a
significant realignment of exchange
rates. Between 1985 and 1989, the dol-
lar plummeted more than 40 percent
against the yen, substantially reducing
the production cost differential between
the United States and Japan. Further-
more, the fluctuations in the dollar-yen
exchange rate complicated the produc-
tion and marketing decisions of the Japa-
nese exporters by creating uncertainty
about future exchange values. To mini-
mize the associated risks, the Japanese
may have been prompted to diversify
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their production mix between nations.FIGURE 1 U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE
MARKETSHARESa
costs roughly 10 percent below those
of the native manufacturers.11
Percent of sales
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a. Includes automobiles and light trucks.
SOURCE: Ward's Automotive Reports.
Taken as a whole, the voluntary export
restrictions, the threat of additional pro-
tectionism, and the low and volatile
dollar-yen exchange rate were compel-
ling reasons for the Japanese manufactur-
ers to expand their production facilities
into the United States. However, by re-
locating, these companies have risked
losing their production cost advantages.
Yet, the Japanese seem to have success-
fully transplanted their production tech-
nology, such as few job classifications,
frequent job rotation and training, work-
er "teams," and worker quality con-
trol. Moreover, their U.S. facilities
have adopted the Japanese approach to
dealing with suppliers, including out-
side sourcing, just-in-time inventory co-
ordination, a tiered supply network, long
contracts, and more frequent interaction.
The net result appears to be a relatively
high productivity rate at the transplants.
In the 1990 model year, cars per hour at
Honda (95) led all U.S. auto manufac-
turers, and the hourly rate was above
average at Mazda (63). At the same
time, the transplants have kept labor
may not be enough: GM officials
recently hinted that more plant closings
may be forthcoming.
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"The size of General Motors is not the
cause of its success, but the conse-
quence of success."
James M. Roche, Chairman, GM,
1967-1972
GM has been the primary loser in the
competition for U.S. market share dur-
ing the past decade, implying that the
corporation carries most of the idle
capacity existing in the industry today.
But this is likely to change dramatically
over the next several years.
In the September 1990 labor agreement
between GM and the UAW, the auto-
maker seems to have positioned itself
for cutting its excess capacity and down-
sizing its work force. After reducing
production workers by nearly 50,000
since 1987, GM reported last fall that it
may cut payrolls by another 60,000
workers, or more than 11 percent, by
1993. In accepting the contract, the
union has apparently traded some of its
job security for earlier retirement eligi-
bility, higher retirement benefits, and
improved severance pay (table 2).
GM's program will be costly. If the com-
pany implements its planned labor force
reduction, analysts estimate that the new
agreement will cost nearly $4 billion
over the next few years. Yet even this
GM's plan to reduce production capac-
ity is almost certain to impact the
Fourth District. Several of the compa-
ny's facilities fall within the District's
boundaries, and one of these plants has
already been rumored as a possible tar-
get for closure.
"Competition is the keen cutting edge
of business, always shaving away at
costs."
Henry Ford II, 1949
The expansion of Japanese auto and
light truck plants in the United States,
combined with flat demand, has created
a large surplus of production capacity
in the domestic motor vehicle industry.
The struggle between an increasing
number of producers for a limited popu-
lation of buyers suggests that only the
fittest will survive. The efficiency of
our economy depends on this sort of
industrial evolution; certainly, consum-
ers stand to benefit.
Realignment is unlikely to occur quickly
or painlessly, though. While prospects
for an economic recovery appear
favorable this summer, the problems in
the U.S. motor vehicle industry — and
in the local economies that it supports
— are likely to persist for several years.
TABLE 2 GM/UAW CONTRACT FEATURES
1987 1990
Maximum lump sum for voluntary termination
Minimum retirement age, 10-29 years seniority
Additional benefits for early retirees
a
Annual pension, workers under age 62
Benefits for workers on temporary layoff
0
Less than 10 years seniority













a. Maximum monthly allowance, payable to age 62.
b. Thirty years seniority.
c. Ninety-five percent of pay for indicated period.
SOURCES; UAW press release, September 1990; and The Wall Street Journal,• Footnotes
1. The Fourth Federal Reserve District in-
cludes Ohio, eastern Kentucky, western Penn-
sylvania, and the northern panhandle of West
Virginia.
2. This estimate includes Honda's new
facility in neighboring East Liberty, Ohio,
which began operations in 1989.
3. In 1993, Toyota is expected to double the
new car capacity at its Georgetown, Kentucky
plant, raising total annual output at this facility
to roughly 400,000 units.
4. Economists often consider the stock of
consumer durables as tangible savings,
inasmuch as it represents a source of future
consumption. It therefore seems reasonable
to assume that the factors contributing to the
lower rates of personal savings over the past
decade have also played a role in the aging
of the U.S. auto stock.
5. Higher auto prices are not responsible
for the aging stock of automobiles: The
inflation-adjusted price of new cars actually
declined 15 percent between 1979 and 1989.
Moreover, although auto loan maturities rose
over this period (from an average of 44
months to 54 months), this lengthening is
more likely a reflection of the aging auto
stock rather than its cause.
6. The transplants are not invulnerable to
changes in the marketplace. The sharp decline
in auto sales since October, for instance, has
resulted in some inventory problems at these
facilities, necessitating production cutbacks.
Nonetheless, according to industry reports,
the Honda, Toyota, and Nissan plants in the
United States have been operating at nearly
full capacity since their inception, with some-
what lesser rates for most other transplants.
7. In fact, the market shares of both Ford
and Chrysler have risen slightly since 1980.
8. For a description of the events that sparked
the emergence of the transplants, see Michael
F. Bryan and Michael W. Dvorak, "American
Automobile Manufacturing: It's Turning Jap-
anese," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary, March 1, 1986.
9. For a discussion of plant location diver-
sification and exchange rate risk, see Rachel
McCulloch, "Unexpected Real Consequences
of Floating Exchange Rates Reconsidered,"
Essays in International Finance, no. 153
(August 1983). pp. 1-28.
10. See Richard Florida, Martin Kenney, and
Andrew Mair, "The Transplant Phenomenon:
Japanese Auto Manufacturers in the United
States," Economic Development Commen-
tary, vol. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 3-9.
11. In 1989, for example, the average annual
earnings of autoworkers at the U.S. facilities
of Honda, Toyota, and Mazda were estimated
at $32,000, compared with more than $36,000
at GM, Ford, and Chrysler. See Kathy Jack-
son, "Transplant Wages Will Rise to Match
Any Gains at Big 3," Automotive News, July
2, 1990, p. 2.
12. See Joseph B. White and Gregory A. Pat-
terson, "G.M. Considers Shutting Plants
Amid Losses," The Wall Street Journal,
April 17, 1991, p. A-3.
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